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Buddhists consider fear to be a root of suffering. In Chapters 2 and 7 of the 
Bodhicaryāvatāra, Śāntideva provides a series of provocative verses aimed at inciting 
fear to motivate taking refuge in the Bodhisattvas and thereby achieve fearlessness. This 
article aims to analyze the moral psychology involved in this transition. It will structurally 
analyze fear in terms that are grounded in, and expand upon, an Abhidharma Buddhist 
analysis of mind. It will then contend that fear, taking refuge, and fearlessness are 
complex intentional attitudes and will argue that the transition between them turns on 
relevant changes in their intentional objects. This will involve analyzing the object of fear 
into four aspects and ‘taking refuge’ as a mode of trust that ameliorates these four aspects. 
This analysis will also distinguish two modes of taking refuge and show the progressive 
role each might play in the transition from fear to fearlessness. 
 
In Chapters 2 and 7 of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, Śāntideva provides a series of provocative verses 
aimed at inciting fear to motivate taking refuge in the Bodhisattvas, the ‘Conquerors’ (2.48) 
and ‘mighty Protectors of the world’ (2.48), and thereby achieve fearlessness. My aim, in this 
chapter, is to investigate the moral psychology involved in this transition. Prima facie, it is 
rather puzzling. Why would one purposefully incite fear if one’s goal is its elimination? In 
logical terms, why generate p if the goal is ~p? Śāntideva writes:  
Night and day, without respite, more life is lost. It never gets longer. Surely, will I not 
die? (2.40) 
Though here laid on my bed, though in the midst of family, it is alone that I must 
endure the agony of the throes of death. (2.41) 
Even someone taken away today to have a limb cut off writhes, throat parched, gaze 
wretched. He sees the world in a completely different way. (2.44) 
But that is nothing to the feverish horror which grips me, covered in my own 
uncontrolled excrement, as Death’s terrifying messengers stand over me (2.45) 
When Death is sizing you up and at every turn the way is blocked, How can it please 
you to eat? How can you sleep? How make love? (7.6) 
Realizing you are like a captive fish, how right it is for you to be afraid right now?  
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How much moreso when you have committed evil action and are faced with the 
intense agonies of hell? (7.11) 
With cowering glances, I search the four directions for deliverance. 
What saint will deliver me from this great fear (2.46) 
Right now I go for refuge to the mighty Protectors of the world, 
Who have undertaken the care of the world, the Conquerors who remove all fear (2.48) 
Trembling with fear I give myself to Samantabhadra and 
Again, freely I give myself to Mañjughoṣa (2.50) 
I have transgressed your command. Now, at seeing the danger, terrified  
I go to you for refuge. Destroy the danger quickly. (2.54) 
 
I give myself wholly to the Conquerors and to their sons… 
You take possession of me. I become fearless (2.8-9) 
How are we to understand the moral psychology underlying Śāntideva’s incitement of fear and 
how does it relate to that involved in taking refuge and becoming fearless?  
The task is one of rational reconstruction. Śāntideva does not, himself, provide this 
analysis. Śāntideva is also a Madhyamaka Buddhist and Mādhyamikas tend not to have a lot 
to say about the nature and structure of specific kinds of mental state. This leaves two options: 
(a) utilise some other Buddhist framework, or (b) draw on some contemporary Western 
framework. This chapter will adopt both approaches. It will appeal to Abhidharma views on 
the general nature of mental states to analyse the nature of fear and will draw on Karen Jones 
(2012) theory of trust to provide an original analysis of the underlying psychology of taking 
refuge. It will unify these two accounts to provide an original explanation of how Śāntideva’s 
incitement of fear may relate to taking refuge and becoming fearless.   
Although this account will appeal to Abhidharma views on the general nature of mental 
states, the task remains one of reconstruction. While Abhidharma thinkers analyse the general 
nature and structure of mental states they do not provide a detailed analysis of fear in particular. 
There are also subtle differences amongst Ābhidharmikas in their general accounts as well as 
interpretive issues about how they are best understood. Resolving all the relevant issues is too 
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much for one chapter. It will thus make some interpretive choices and provide an original 
analysis of fear (and taking refuge) informed by these choices. It is also too much for one 
chapter to provide a fully articulated and defended analysis of fear or taking refuge. Each, 
alone, would be sufficient subject matter for an independent article. This chapter aims merely 
to provide enough of a sketch of such an analysis such that it can be used to help explain the 
moral psychology underlying Śāntideva’s views on fear, taking refuge and the transition to 
fearlessness.  
There are four parts to my reconstruction. First, I structurally analyze fear in terms that 
are grounded in, and expand upon, an Abhidharma Buddhist analysis of mind. I contend that 
fear is a complex intentional attitude and will analyse the object of fear into four aspects. 
Second, I structurally analyse ‘taking refuge in the Bodhisattvas’ as a form of trust that 
ameliorates some aspects of the object of fear. Third, I consider some objections to this 
analysis. I then close by considering a more refined analysis of the transition from fear, taking 
refuge to fearlessness that aims to avert these objections. 
 
1. An Abhidharma-inspired structural analysis of fear 
The Abhidharma philosophical tradition is widely understood as an attempt to 
comprehensively and exhaustively map mental and physical phenomena (Thompson & 
Dreyfus, 2007). It conceived of the mind in terms of individual moments of phenomenal 
awareness. Mental states or events are distinguished from other kinds of events by ‘being 
aware’ or cognisant (jñā). Of what are they aware? Of the objects that are present to them. For 
Abhidharma, apprehension of an object (intentionality, in the Brentano sense) is a defining 
characteristic of awareness, mind or consciousness. All mental states are intentional in the 
sense of apprehending an object. The Abhidharma tradition can be understood to analyse the 
intentionality of the mental into two necessary aspects:  
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(a) citta (or vijñāna, awareness): the bare function of being aware of, or presencing, an 
object;  
(b) caitasika (or determining factors): the function of determining the qualitative nature of 
this awareness (viz. the kind of object it presences and its particular characteristics) 
Prominent Abhidharma thinkers appear to agree on the necessity of these two aspects or 
constituents of mental states but disagree on the number and types of each. Consider (b). 
Vasubandhu identifies 46 determining factors, of which 10 are held to be omnipresent or 
‘universally conjoined’ in all mental states (AKBh 1.2.3:189). Asaṅga, however, identifies 52 
determining factors (ABS 1.1.1:8-9), of which only 5 are held to be omnipresent (ABS 
1.3.6:75).  
I will focus my analysis on Asaṅga’s list of 5 omnipresent determining factors. They 
are: feeling (vedanā), discernment (saṃjñā), intention (cetanā), attention (manasikāra) and 
contact (sparśa). While these determining factors are easy to list, it is difficult to specify their 
precise nature. Consider ‘feeling’ (vedanā). The claim that vedanā is an omnipresent factor of 
all mental states could be taken to mean that they have a feeling tone or affective dimension. 
This might be taken to imply, in the first instance, that every mental state or event has 
phenomenal qualities. Abhidharma thinkers also maintain that these phenomenal qualities are 
valenced as pleasant, unpleasant and neutral (ABS 1.1.1:6). This valenced categorization is not 
to be understood as the product of reflective judgment but, rather, is an aspect of conscious 
experience. 
Just as important is intention (cetanā) or the orientation of the mental state with respect 
to an object. There is much dispute about what this means. On my account, cetanā is neither a 
volition (of intending to do some action) nor the mere presencing of an intentional object 
(which is a function of citta). It is also not motivationally neutral. Rather, cetanā is an 
orientation or attitude towards an object that is influenced by its valenced affective dimension 
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and is subject to moral evaluation. This orientation can be, and often is, qualified in various 
ways. Attraction, aversion and care are examples of qualified orientations with respect to the 
object of awareness. They are responsive to variations in the valenced feeling-tone (pleasure 
or pain) as regards the object; aversion generally couples with pain, attraction with pleasure. It 
is also subject to moral evaluation as it gives rise to the kinds of volitional behaviour that accrue 
karmic consequences.  
To finish off the set: Asaṅga presents discernment (saṃjñā) as the capacity to 
distinguish the particular qualities of the intentional object; the kind of object it is as well as its 
characteristics (ABS 1.1.1:9). Attention (manasikāra) is presented as the capacity to focus the 
mental factors on the object. Contact (sparśa) is taken to refer to the causal factors that 
determine the arising of the mental state.  
Two key insights can be derived from this five-fold analysis of mental events. First, it 
implies that mental events are multi-compositional in the sense that they have these five 
features or qualities. Second, they are intentional in the sense that they involve awareness of 
objects.  
As mentioned, Abhidharma philosophers do not specifically analyze the nature and 
structure of fear. However, the above can serve as a general framework for the construction of 
such an account. Qua mental event, we might say that fear is a multi-compositional intentional 
attitude comprised of the above five determining factors. Moreover, the way in which these 
factors are determined is what individuates fear from other kinds of mental event. That is, fear 
is distinguished as fear (rather than, say, anger or compassion or equanimity etc.) relative to its 
typical kinds of intentional object, its typical modes of bodily-behavioural orientation to such 
objects, its typical kinds and degrees of valenced apprehension, and typical modes of contact 
as triggering cause.  
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Now, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a detailed and fully articulated 
analysis of how these determining factors pertain to fear. But here is a suggestion. In typical 
cases, the kind of valenced apprehension involved in fear is negative and experienced as 
unpleasant or disturbing feelings of various degrees of intensity. And the typical modes of 
bodily-behavioural orientation are aversive and manifest in subtle or overt varieties of freeze, 
flight, fight modes of behaviour and physiological response. In many cases, a fearing subject 
may not be aware of all these elements and their typical modes of manifestation. But this need 
not imply that they are not necessary constituents. Instead, one might argue that they are 
masked in some way.  
There is one element of this complex analysis of fear that is not adequately captured by 
the five-fold account sketched thus far; namely, whether the intentional object of fear has some 
general nature or structure. This is not to propose that all events of fear have a single intentional 
object. That would be absurd; we are afraid of all kinds of things and not all necessarily of the 
same kinds of things. But is there a general structure that all objects of fear have in common? 
I propose that there is and that it is useful to explicate in order to understand how taking refuge 
can lead to fearlessness. I propose that the intentional object of fear is determined in four ways. 
It is experienced as:  
1. Possible. This is a modal notion that is tied to anticipation and expectation but distinct 
from the actual triggering cause of fear. Some event may occasion or trigger the arising 
of fear (hearing the barking of a dog). What one fears, however, the object of fear, is 
something that could occur (being harmed by the dog) rather than what is occurring. 
The more probable the possible occurrence is assumed to be, the more intense the 
valenced dimension of this mental state. This is a phenomenological claim, about how 
the object is experienced, which holds irrespective of whether the anticipated event is, 
in fact, metaphysically or logically possible.  
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2. Unwanted. The relevant possibility is appraised negatively. This appraisal manifests in 
a negative valence (unpleasant, disturbing feelings) and aversive bodily and 
behavioural responses. 
3. Uncertain in susceptibility to agential control. There is a sense in which it is not entirely 
up to the agent to foreclose this unwanted possibility as a mere matter of will or choice. 
This connects to a sense of vulnerability in the face of a wider world of agents and 
causal laws that are outside the subject’s personal control. The less perceived agential 
control, the more probable and unwanted the occurrence, the more intensely the state is 
experienced. 
4. Matters. It matters to the subject whether it occurs, where this manifests values, needs, 
interests, goals or attachments of the subject. This fourth criterion is the measure or 
reason why the relevant possibility is unwanted. 
In sum, the more some possible occurrence matters, the less perceived agential control over its 
occurrence, the greater its probability, the more it is unwanted, the more intensely will the 
mental state be experienced; i.e. its valence will be heightened, aversive bodily and behavioural 
responses will be more extreme, and the object will be more obvious and focal to attention.  
I propose that the transition to fearlessness implied by Śāntideva’s verses involves a 
change in some or all these four dimensions of the intentional object of fear. What is the 
relevant possibility that is feared? According to the verses cited earlier, it is death. Śāntideva 
elsewhere discusses illness and impending suffering, more generally, and so there is reason to 
think the argument has more general application. However, I will focus on the example offered 
in the verses we are considering. Death is a possible occurrence, probable to the point of 
certainty, which no act of will or choice can circumvent in a given lifetime. Why does its 
occurrence matter and why is it thus unwanted in Śāntideva’s view? Śāntideva offers two 
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possibilities. First, death involves suffering; “the agony of the throes of death” (2.41). Second, 
death marks the point at which suffering is likely to arise; “faced with the intense agonies of 
hell” (7.11). It is the latter that is relevant to our analysis. It is to circumvent this “danger” 
(2.54) that the subject turns to the Bodhisattvas for protection. What is the cause of this danger? 
It is the negative karmic consequences of having committed evil actions (7.11) and of 
transgressing the Buddha’s moral teachings (2.54).  
What is Śāntideva’s purpose for inciting this fear of the karmic consequences of our 
actions? Presumably, to motivate a desire to do something about it. Śāntideva goes to great 
lengths to emphasize the great probability of these intense sufferings occurring. He writes that 
at the moment of death, we are “faced with” (7.11) the agonies that lie ahead; it is a danger 
towards which we are drawn “night and day, without respite” (2.40). His graphic descriptions 
of the relevant kinds of sufferings not only emphasize its undesirability but aim to 
physiologically arouse a high degree of fear. The presupposition seems to be that the more 
graphically described this unwanted possibility, the more physiologically aroused the fear and 
the stronger the desire to avert its occurrence.  If this is right, what is the role of taking refuge 
in the Bodhisattvas in this transition? And why is this Śāntideva’s response to the fear thus 
incited? To answer this question, we need a psychological analysis of ‘taking refuge’.  
 
2. A Structural Analysis of ‘Taking Refuge in the Bodhisattvas’ 
How might we understand ‘taking refuge in the bodhisattvas’ in moral psychological terms? 
One way to understand it is as a form of trust. Philosophers offer competing accounts of trust. 
According to one view, it is a two-place relationship between a truster and a trustee (singular 
or collective), where the relationship is best understood as a certain attitude held by the former 
towards the latter. Inspired by the recent work of Karen Jones (2012), this attitude can be 
understood as one of optimism or confidence that the trustee is:  
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(a) relevantly competent to do a certain act (they can do it), and  
(b) responsive to the confidence of the truster (they will do it because they are being  
counted on to do so).  
To take refuge in the Bodhisattvas in the face of negative karmic consequences is thus to adopt 
an attitude of profound optimism and confidence that the Bodhisattvas both can and will 
prevent the occurrence of negative karmic consequences after one dies. What reason has one 
to adopt this attitude? A belief in the Bodhisattvas great compassion for the suffering of all 
sentient beings (of which set one is a member). How is this a remedy for fear? It ameliorates 
the first of the four aspects of the object of fear; namely, the sense of these karmic consequences 
being possible. When one takes refuge in the Bodhisattvas, one trusts that they can and will 
ensure that this possibility won’t actualise. The greater the trust the less probable these 
sufferings appear. One becomes fearless because assured that these occurrences are no longer 
a possibility for oneself.  
 
3. Objections 
I will now turn to consider a couple of objections that might be raised against this analysis. 
First, one might wonder why taking refuge in the Bodhisattvas is the proposed response 
to fear of karmic consequences rather than, for instance, acting morally. Reference to karmic 
consequences is often made in Buddhist literature to motivate the self-interested person to act 
morally. Many consider moral action to be an antidote to negative karmic consequences. It 
might seem, however, that nothing particularly moral follows from the above analysis. It might 
even be consistent with immorality; so long as the Bodhisattvas can and will prevent these 
negative consequences, the agent might otherwise act as they please.    
One response to this objection is to simply say that taking refuge is a moral action. It 
would thus follow that fear of karmic consequences does motivate moral action in the above 
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analysis, albeit a moral action of only one kind. For this to be plausible, however, it would need 
to be supplemented with an account of the criteria for moral action. One might attempt to argue 
that the reasoning is consequentialist, but the only negative consequences forgone are those 
that accrue to the agent. No plausible version of consequentialism accommodates such a high 
degree of partiality.     
This relates to a further, and perhaps more fundamental, objection. It might appear that 
taking refuge in the Bodhisattva’s is fundamentally egoistic. One enters this trusting 
relationship to foreclose an unwanted possibility occurring to oneself, which matters for 
reasons grounded in one’s own personal interest and values. If it did not matter to whom these 
karmic consequences occurred, the subject might perform various other acts to avoid its 
occurrence. By taking refuge in the Bodhisattvas, the subject trusts that they can be counted on 
to save them, the trusting agent, from this outcome. According to the teachings of the Buddha, 
however, egoistic self-concern is not only at the root of many kinds of mental afflictions, 
including fear, it also manifests ignorance of the fact that there is no self (anātman), that 
everything which exists is dependently originated (pratītyasamutpāda), and thereby 
impermanent (anicca). If this is right, one might object that the motivation for taking refuge in 
the Bodhisattvas is fundamentally flawed and manifests a subtle mental defilement. 
 
4. A more refined analysis 
I close by considering a more refined analysis of the transition from fear to fearlessness by 
means of taking refuge that aims to avert the above objections.  
As with the original analysis, Śāntideva incites fear to motivate taking refuge in the 
Bodhisattvas and thus entering a relationship of trust. Why does Śāntideva do this? I now 
propose that it is part of a more complex strategy to promote taking refuge in the Buddha’s 
teachings, the Buddha-dharma, an important aspect of which concerns his teaching of no-self. 
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Some support for this claim might be derived from the fact that the concluding chapter of the 
Bodhicaryāvatāra is devoted to a dialectical debate between two interlocutors on the 
metaphysics of self.  
If this is Śāntideva’s eventual aim, why does he initially motivate taking refuge in the 
Bodhisattvas? According to this more refined analysis, he understands that his audience is 
likely to be concerned for their own well-being and, since taking refuge in the Bodhisattvas 
engages this self-concern, understands that they are likely to be motivated by this advice. But 
(and this is the refinement) taking refuge in the Bodhisattvas brings the agent in close contact 
with the teachings of the Buddha. This provides for a new possibility; namely, openness to 
learning about the Buddha’s teachings and thereby the possibility of realising their truth. But 
why take this route? The Buddha’s teachings challenge core beliefs, particularly about the 
nature and status of self. Agents are often resistant to changing their core beliefs. Inciting 
intense fear is an effective strategy to motivate this difficult process of reflection and revision.  
If this is plausible, then ‘taking-refuge’, when applied to the Buddha-dharma, can’t be 
the same as when applied to the Bodhisattvas. This is because it is no longer a two-place 
relationship between agents. This refined sense of ‘taking-refuge’ might instead be understood 
as an attitude of ‘openness to the truth’ of what the Buddha says. This is not to say one 
necessarily accepts the Buddha’s teachings as true. Rather, this second sense of ‘taking-refuge’ 
marks the beginning of a process rather than its culmination. It takes the Buddha’s teachings 
as a complex hypothetical, the truth of which one is open to realizing and affirming.  
What is the culmination of this process? How does this more refined sense of ‘taking 
refuge’ contribute to the achievement of fearlessness, as Śāntideva proposes? The answer to 
this question depends on how one interprets the nature of the Buddha-dharma; in particular, 
the Buddha’s teaching of no self (anātman). There are (at least) two possible answers to this 
final question which reflect two distinct positions on this teaching. 
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No Object View: Śāntideva is a Buddhist in the Mādhyamika philosophical tradition. For 
several prominent Madhyamaka thinkers, to realise the truth of no self is to remove all 
conception of ‘I, me, mine’ (ahaṃkāra). According to the No Object View, the realisation of 
this metaphysical truth has direct bearing on one’s psychology; it removes a crucial 
presupposition that underpins negative mental states. It also has direct bearing on one’s 
phenomenology by removing any sense of self from the scope of experience. This might help 
explain the transition from fear to fearlessness by removing the object of value and thus the 
basis of concern presupposed by fear. When a subject fears the karmic consequences of their 
actions and seeks refuge in the protection of the Bodhisattvas, it matters to them whether these 
consequences occur. If they did not care about them eventuating they would not be an object 
of fear. This self-concern is grounded in a value for personal well-being. Realizing the truth of 
no-self involves realizing that this concern does not have a proper object. A genuine and deep 
understanding of this point thus results in the cessation of self-concern and thus of those mental 
states for which this self-concern is a necessary presupposition. If there is no self, there is no 
proper object that could be threatened by anticipated possibilities and relative to which these 
possibilities are unwanted. If there is no-self, there is no-one for whom these unwanted 
possibilities matter; the sufferings that occur at the point of, and after, death. Taking refuge in 
the teachings of the Buddha thus leads to fearlessness by eliminating an essential constituent 
of fear.  
This seems like a plausible reading of Śāntideva. One might nevertheless have (at least) 
two concerns with the No Object View. First, it assumes that mattering is necessarily egoistic. 
This is because it infers a denial of ego from the denial of self, a denial of egoism from the 
denial of ego, and a denial of mattering from the denial of egoism. It is in this way that it 
undermines the object of fear and suggests a transition to fearlessness. One might object, 
however, that mattering is not necessarily egoistic. An unwanted possibility can matter to a 
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subject, in ways that reflect their values, but without being necessarily in their interest. 
Consider, for instance, observing an unknown child teetering on the edge of a pool. It seems 
possible to fear the child drowning without necessarily presupposing self-concern. If this is 
right, then realizing the truth of no-self does not necessarily undermine the possibility of an 
unwanted possibility mattering to a subject and, as such, leaves open the possibility of fear.  
Second, one might object that the No Object View is too coarse-grained with unwanted 
implications. It undermines egoism by eliminating the ego. However, it would seem to also 
and thereby undermine all forms of prudential reasoning (such as brushing one’s teeth, putting 
on sunblock, buying groceries for one’s evening meal) grounded in a reasonable degree of self-
concern. It would also seem to undermine the distinction between self and other assumed by 
such bodhisattva virtues as compassion (karuṇā), great compassion (mahakaruṇā) and the 
accomplishment of bodhicitta (the commitment to serve beings until their suffering is 
alleviated). If there is no self then there is also no other. If fear is eradicated by removing the 
object of concern (the self), a similar argument can be mobilized against the object of concern 
(the other) presupposed by compassion and other-directed virtues. 
 
Dependent Self View: There is a second possible answer that might avoid both above problems. 
According to the Dependent Self View, the positive counterpart to realizing the metaphysical 
truth of no-self does not entail a psychological and phenomenological eradication of all notions 
of self. Rather, it entails their revision in view of the Buddha’s teaching of dependent 
origination (pratītyasamutpāda). On this view, one retains a phenomenological distinction 
between self and other but gains a deep understanding that, metaphysically, this distinction is 
a mere convention that is used to pick out objects that are not essentially distinct but exist 
dependently upon causes and conditions. Reflecting on the conventional nature of these 
distinctions, one might realize that there is no good reason to privilege the interests of a merely 
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conventional self. Rather than eliminating the object of concern, it could be argued that this 
realization gives reason to expand its scope, from egoistic self-concern to altruistic self-other 
concern. As we have argued, concern or mattering always manifests values that are local to a 
subject. However, the relevant value need not be egoistic but may extend to all relevant 
subjects. What makes a subject a relevant object of concern? The fact that they experience 
suffering.  
By retaining a (revised) distinction between self and other, the Dependent Self View is 
consistent with Śāntideva’s endorsement of the bodhisattva virtues, bodhicitta, and ordinary 
forms of prudential reasoning. It thereby averts the second problem raised in response to the 
No Object View. It might, however, appear to be much worse off with respect to the first 
problem raised against this view. It was objected that it leaves open the possibility of fear by 
failing to undermine certain unwanted possibilities mattering to a subject in terms that qualify 
them as objects of fear.  One might worry, however, that the Dependent Self View not only also 
admits these possibilities but additionally expands the scope of unwanted possibilities that are 
feared. Rather than simply fearing the possible unwanted sufferings that are likely to occur to 
oneself, grounded in an egoistic sense of value, this solution seems to entail that one now fears 
the possible unwanted sufferings wherever they might occur, to whomever they might occur. 
Rather than leading to fearlessness, it might seem that this solution leads to the (potentially 
limitless) expansion of fear. How can this approach lead to fearlessness?  
 The solution, I propose, involves contextualising this analysis in relation to bodhicitta; 
the goal of the bodhisattva ideal at the heart of the Bodhicaryāvatāra. Bodhicitta is standardly 
articulated as a commitment to bring about the cessation of suffering of all sentient beings. The 
purpose of inciting fear is to motivate agents to action; to avert the object of fear from 
eventuating. The relevant object of fear is suffering, wherever and to whomever it may occur. 
When the scope of evaluative concern is properly extended, we might think of fear as 
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motivating the very best kinds of altruistic action. Taking refuge in the Buddha’s teaching, we 
might argue, transforms fear from an egoistic motivation, grounded in a concern with personal 
well-being, to an altruistic self-other motivation that is grounded in a disvalue of suffering 
wherever it occurs. How does this lead to fearlessness? When all sufferings are eradicated, 
when all unwanted possibilities of this kind are foreclosed, then and only then is fearlessness 
achieved. This appears to be concurrent with achieving the objective of bodhicitta; namely, the 
cessation of suffering of all sentient beings. On closer inspection, however, it is actually 
concurrent with the cessation of all future, potential, possible sufferings, not merely those that 




Why would one purposefully incite fear if one’s goal is its elimination? And how are we to 
understand the role of taking refuge in making this transition? I have argued that Śāntideva, 
incites fear with an aim of transforming egoistic self-concern into altruistic self-other concern. 
This is achieved by provoking their self-interest and motivating them to take refuge in the 
protection of the Bodhisattvas. This puts the subject in proximity to the Buddhas teachings and 
thereby the possibility of realising their truth. These teachings challenge core beliefs, which 
subjects are typically reluctant to change. Śāntideva’s incitement of fear thus serves a 
secondary role; it motivates subjects to engage in the difficult task of belief-revision. This may, 
in turn, lead subjects to revise their understanding of the nature of self and other, inspire an 
altruistic concern for the sufferings of others and thereby the arising of bodhicitta; a 
commitment to remove all sufferings wherever they occur. In the mid-term, this entails an 
expanded set of unwanted possibilities that matter to them and thus feared. Fearlessness is 
achieved at the culmination of the progressive achievement of the goal of bodhicitta, which 
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